Επαφές με τον διευθύνοντα σύμβουλο της Aegean Θεόδωρο Βασιλάκη και τον γιό του Ευτύχιο, είχε ο Αμερικανός πρέσβης με στόχο να αποτρέψει την αγορά αεροσκαφών Αirbus αντί των αμερικανικών Boeing.
Οι Αμερικανοί διπλωμάτες αναφέρονται σε φήμες σύμφωνα με τις οποίες η ευρωπαϊκή επιτροπή ασκούσε πιέσεις στην ελληνική κυβέρνηση να μην προχωρήσει σε ιδιωτικοποίηση αλλά σε εκκαθάριση της Ολυμπιακής. Σε αντάλλαγμα αυτών των πιέσεων, σύμφωνα πάντα με τις φήμες, η Aegean θα συμφωνούσε να αγοράσει αεροσκάφη τύπου Airbus.
O διευθύνων σύμβουλος της Aegean παραδέχθηκε ότι είχε έρθει σε επαφή με ευρωπαίους διπλωμάτες σχετικά με την αγορά αεροσκαφών Airbus αλλά αρνήθηκε ότι υπήρξε οποιαδήποτε πίεση προς όφελος της εταιρείας του.
Η αμερικανική πρεσβεία πάντως δεν φάνηκε να πείθεται από τις εξηγήσεις του Βασιλάκη και σε σχόλιό της αναφέρει ότι οι Βρυξέλλες ήταν πράγματι σε θέση να βοηθήσουν την Αegean.
Διαβάστε το σχετικό τηλεγράφημα
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 001903
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2015
TAGS: EAIR, ECON, GR
SUBJECT: AEGEAN CEO: IT'S JUST BUSINESS, AIRBUS FITS OUR
OLYMPIC-LESS FUTURE
REF: A. ATHENS 1832
B. ATHENS 1836
C. ATHENS 1851
Classified By: AMB Charles Ries According to reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: Ambassador met with Aegean Airlines CEO
Theodoros Vassilakis and fellow Board-member and son,
Eftihios Vassilakis, to discuss Aegean's recent decision to
purchase six Airbus aircraft over Boeing aircraft. Theodoros
denied any political angle in the Airbus decision, claiming
that Aegean is merely looking ahead toward a future without
main rival Olympic Airlines, where Aegean expands its service
throughout Europe. Noting that Airbus and Boeing had made
very similar offers on price, the decision had come down to
the novelty marketing potential of switching to Airbus,
lingering irritation with unspecified support problems during
their relationship with Boeing, and most significantly,
greater flexibility in training air crews in the Airbus 319
through 321 family as opposed to Boeing aircraft.
Furthermore, father and son confirmed that the switch to
Airbus would mean the complete phasing out of Boeing aircraft
by 2010, when the Aegean fleet might number as many as 25
aircraft. Theodoros did agree to entertain a final approach
from Boeing, although they felt the likelihood of the
decision being changed was no more than "10 or 20 percent."
End Summary.
2. (C) Ambassador met with Aegean Airlines CEO Theodoros
Vassilakis, as well as Vassilakis's son and fellow Aegean
Board-member, Eftihios Vassilakis. Ambassador outlined U.S.
concern regarding Aegean's recent decision to negotiate the
purchase of six Airbus 320s instead of Boeing 737s, even
before Boeing's scheduled final presentation. Theodoros
denied that political objectives had played any role in the
decision, citing Aegean's desire to remain independent.
Eftihios laid out the three major factors that had influenced
the decision to go with Airbus: a "novelty" effect of
switching airframes that could boost passenger interest and
market share, the effect of unspecified past support problems
Aegean had had with Boeing, and that the Airbus 319 to 321
family of aircraft provided the greatest growth flexibility,
especially in flight crew training requirements. Given that
the price quoted by the two competitors was similar, and that
the economics were highly dependent on future operating
conditions, the decision had come down to these less
quantifiable factors.
3. (C) When asked if there wasn't an offsetting cost
penalty in operating a split Boeing/Airbus fleet, Eftihios
noted that in the short-term Airbus would absorb direct,
non-personnel costs of retraining flight crew, and that in
the long-term there would be no split fleet, as Aegean
intends to completely phase out its Boeing aircraft.
Expanding on this bombshell, Eftihios outlined Aegean's plan:
BAE RJ turboprops are to be immediately phased out and
replaced by leased 737s until 2007, then all Boeing aircraft
will be phased out for Airbus aircraft by 2010. Eftihios
noted that Aegean's Board, envisioning a future without an
Olympic Airlines, sees Aegean's size as potentially 25
aircraft by 2010, all of which may be Airbuses.
4. (C) In discussing the privatization of Olympic Airlines,
both father and son were confident that Olympic would be
defunct within six months. They calculated that Olympic
Airlines, and the ground services company Olympic Airways,
were costing the GoG 600-800 million euro in losses annually.
Ambassador noted that it had been observed that EC
Transportation Minister Barrot's cabinet was suddenly showing
great interest in the Olympic privatization, and that rumors
were circulating that Aegean had agreed to buy Airbus in
return for increased EC pressure on the GoG to scuttle any
Olympic privatization effort and force the company into
liquidation. Ambassador noted that even in the absence of
any overt agreement, the rumors looked bad. Theodoros
bristled at the thought that the EC would help Aegean,
observing that the EC had done nothing to stop Olympic's
illegal subsidization for over six years. He admitted that
EU ambassadors had been in to see him about purchasing Airbus
aircraft, but denied that he, or anyone else from Aegean, had
asked for any political assistance. He stressed that he was
not naive, and after years of frustration in trying to level
the playing field between Aegean and Olympic, he did not
believe that anyone in the EC would ever help his company.
5. (C) Ambassador posed the question of whether one of those
EU ambassadors might have, even without a direct request,
approached Barrot to step up the pressure on the GoG
regarding the fate of Olympic Airlines in an attempt to sway
the balance. Father and son agreed that this might have
happened, but denied it had had any impact on Aegean's
decision. Eftihios outlined Aegean's strategic view: with
Olympic Airlines out of the picture in no more than six
months, Aegean has to position itself to take advantage of
its future position as Greece's only air carrier. In the
Board's view, the 737 family is too limited in size,
especially if Aegean finds itself eventually needing to fly
wide-bodied aircraft. With the Airbus purchase, Aegean can
purchase smaller aircraft for current needs, yet be
positioned to move more easily into larger aircraft to meet
future needs. Returning to the issue of Boeing having lost
its final presentation opportunity, Theodoros offered to
allow Boeing to come in with a final offer if they would like
to do so. Eftihios agreed, but noted that in his opinion,
there was only a ten or twenty percent chance of Boeing being
able to present a package attractive enough to reverse the
Board's decision.
6. (C) Comment: It is unfortunate to hear that Aegean is
planning to drop Boeing from its fleet entirely, even more so
given that they are planning on expanding their total fleet
size, possibly to include large aircraft. The rationale
behind Aegean's decision is clearer, however, given it's
Board's view that Olympic Airlines is doomed and that Aegean
should position itself to become a larger player in the
European market. Although neither Vassilakis admitted to any
overt political influence in the Aegean purchase decision, it
is hard to escape the conclusion that the Board was not
averse to becoming "more European" by purchasing Airbus,
given their expansion interests. It is likewise difficult to
avoid concluding that, expressly or implicitly stated,
Brussels was in a position to help Aegean out with its
control over the fate of Olympic Airlines. If the Europeans
were aware that this deal was potentially larger than a
one-time, six aircraft deal, then their willingness to use
that influence, even if not directly requested, is readily
explained.
7. (C) The final variable in this saga is the role the GoG
might play in the event that it concludes that Aegean had a
hand in scuttling, or attempting to scuttle, the Olympic
privatization deal. Local press has reported that Olympic's
fifth privatization tender is in jeopardy, and if it fails,
it is hard to imagine that GoG will not carry out their
earlier promise to finally liquidate the company. If the GoG
has already approached Aegean about the alleged Barrot
connection between increased EC pressure on the Olympic deal
and the Aegean Airbus purchase, neither Vassilakis gave any
indication to that effect. It is more likely the GoG is
waiting until after the July 15th meeting between Minister of
Transportation Liapis and Barrot in Brussels before taking
action. Ambassador will seek a readout of that meeting as
soon as Liapis returns next week. End Comment.
RIES
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2015
TAGS: EAIR, ECON, GR
SUBJECT: AEGEAN CEO: IT'S JUST BUSINESS, AIRBUS FITS OUR
OLYMPIC-LESS FUTURE
REF: A. ATHENS 1832
B. ATHENS 1836
C. ATHENS 1851
Classified By: AMB Charles Ries According to reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: Ambassador met with Aegean Airlines CEO
Theodoros Vassilakis and fellow Board-member and son,
Eftihios Vassilakis, to discuss Aegean's recent decision to
purchase six Airbus aircraft over Boeing aircraft. Theodoros
denied any political angle in the Airbus decision, claiming
that Aegean is merely looking ahead toward a future without
main rival Olympic Airlines, where Aegean expands its service
throughout Europe. Noting that Airbus and Boeing had made
very similar offers on price, the decision had come down to
the novelty marketing potential of switching to Airbus,
lingering irritation with unspecified support problems during
their relationship with Boeing, and most significantly,
greater flexibility in training air crews in the Airbus 319
through 321 family as opposed to Boeing aircraft.
Furthermore, father and son confirmed that the switch to
Airbus would mean the complete phasing out of Boeing aircraft
by 2010, when the Aegean fleet might number as many as 25
aircraft. Theodoros did agree to entertain a final approach
from Boeing, although they felt the likelihood of the
decision being changed was no more than "10 or 20 percent."
End Summary.
2. (C) Ambassador met with Aegean Airlines CEO Theodoros
Vassilakis, as well as Vassilakis's son and fellow Aegean
Board-member, Eftihios Vassilakis. Ambassador outlined U.S.
concern regarding Aegean's recent decision to negotiate the
purchase of six Airbus 320s instead of Boeing 737s, even
before Boeing's scheduled final presentation. Theodoros
denied that political objectives had played any role in the
decision, citing Aegean's desire to remain independent.
Eftihios laid out the three major factors that had influenced
the decision to go with Airbus: a "novelty" effect of
switching airframes that could boost passenger interest and
market share, the effect of unspecified past support problems
Aegean had had with Boeing, and that the Airbus 319 to 321
family of aircraft provided the greatest growth flexibility,
especially in flight crew training requirements. Given that
the price quoted by the two competitors was similar, and that
the economics were highly dependent on future operating
conditions, the decision had come down to these less
quantifiable factors.
3. (C) When asked if there wasn't an offsetting cost
penalty in operating a split Boeing/Airbus fleet, Eftihios
noted that in the short-term Airbus would absorb direct,
non-personnel costs of retraining flight crew, and that in
the long-term there would be no split fleet, as Aegean
intends to completely phase out its Boeing aircraft.
Expanding on this bombshell, Eftihios outlined Aegean's plan:
BAE RJ turboprops are to be immediately phased out and
replaced by leased 737s until 2007, then all Boeing aircraft
will be phased out for Airbus aircraft by 2010. Eftihios
noted that Aegean's Board, envisioning a future without an
Olympic Airlines, sees Aegean's size as potentially 25
aircraft by 2010, all of which may be Airbuses.
4. (C) In discussing the privatization of Olympic Airlines,
both father and son were confident that Olympic would be
defunct within six months. They calculated that Olympic
Airlines, and the ground services company Olympic Airways,
were costing the GoG 600-800 million euro in losses annually.
Ambassador noted that it had been observed that EC
Transportation Minister Barrot's cabinet was suddenly showing
great interest in the Olympic privatization, and that rumors
were circulating that Aegean had agreed to buy Airbus in
return for increased EC pressure on the GoG to scuttle any
Olympic privatization effort and force the company into
liquidation. Ambassador noted that even in the absence of
any overt agreement, the rumors looked bad. Theodoros
bristled at the thought that the EC would help Aegean,
observing that the EC had done nothing to stop Olympic's
illegal subsidization for over six years. He admitted that
EU ambassadors had been in to see him about purchasing Airbus
aircraft, but denied that he, or anyone else from Aegean, had
asked for any political assistance. He stressed that he was
not naive, and after years of frustration in trying to level
the playing field between Aegean and Olympic, he did not
believe that anyone in the EC would ever help his company.
5. (C) Ambassador posed the question of whether one of those
EU ambassadors might have, even without a direct request,
approached Barrot to step up the pressure on the GoG
regarding the fate of Olympic Airlines in an attempt to sway
the balance. Father and son agreed that this might have
happened, but denied it had had any impact on Aegean's
decision. Eftihios outlined Aegean's strategic view: with
Olympic Airlines out of the picture in no more than six
months, Aegean has to position itself to take advantage of
its future position as Greece's only air carrier. In the
Board's view, the 737 family is too limited in size,
especially if Aegean finds itself eventually needing to fly
wide-bodied aircraft. With the Airbus purchase, Aegean can
purchase smaller aircraft for current needs, yet be
positioned to move more easily into larger aircraft to meet
future needs. Returning to the issue of Boeing having lost
its final presentation opportunity, Theodoros offered to
allow Boeing to come in with a final offer if they would like
to do so. Eftihios agreed, but noted that in his opinion,
there was only a ten or twenty percent chance of Boeing being
able to present a package attractive enough to reverse the
Board's decision.
6. (C) Comment: It is unfortunate to hear that Aegean is
planning to drop Boeing from its fleet entirely, even more so
given that they are planning on expanding their total fleet
size, possibly to include large aircraft. The rationale
behind Aegean's decision is clearer, however, given it's
Board's view that Olympic Airlines is doomed and that Aegean
should position itself to become a larger player in the
European market. Although neither Vassilakis admitted to any
overt political influence in the Aegean purchase decision, it
is hard to escape the conclusion that the Board was not
averse to becoming "more European" by purchasing Airbus,
given their expansion interests. It is likewise difficult to
avoid concluding that, expressly or implicitly stated,
Brussels was in a position to help Aegean out with its
control over the fate of Olympic Airlines. If the Europeans
were aware that this deal was potentially larger than a
one-time, six aircraft deal, then their willingness to use
that influence, even if not directly requested, is readily
explained.
7. (C) The final variable in this saga is the role the GoG
might play in the event that it concludes that Aegean had a
hand in scuttling, or attempting to scuttle, the Olympic
privatization deal. Local press has reported that Olympic's
fifth privatization tender is in jeopardy, and if it fails,
it is hard to imagine that GoG will not carry out their
earlier promise to finally liquidate the company. If the GoG
has already approached Aegean about the alleged Barrot
connection between increased EC pressure on the Olympic deal
and the Aegean Airbus purchase, neither Vassilakis gave any
indication to that effect. It is more likely the GoG is
waiting until after the July 15th meeting between Minister of
Transportation Liapis and Barrot in Brussels before taking
action. Ambassador will seek a readout of that meeting as
soon as Liapis returns next week. End Comment.
RIES
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