Μέτρα 8,2 δισ. ευρώ, για την διετία 2013 -2014, επιπλέον από όσα προβλέπει το μνημόνιο και με το μεσοπρόθεσμο σχέδιο δράσης, θα πρέπει να εξειδικεύσει η κυβέρνηση, σύμφωνα με όσα αναφέρει στο προσχέδιο της έκθεση της η τρόικα για την 5η αξιολόγηση της ελληνικής οικονομίας.
Όπως προκύπτει από τα στοιχεία που δημοσιεύονται στην έκθεση, θα απαιτηθούν πρόσθετες. παρεμβάσεις 3,4 δισ. ευρώ για το 2013 και 4,8 δισ. ευρώ για το 2014οι οποίες, προφανώς θα αποτελέσουν και το αντικείμενο του νέου γύρου διαπραγματεύσεων μεταξύ της κυβέρνησης και της τρόικας. «Τα πρόσθετα μέτρα της κυβέρνησης θα επιτρέψουν στην Ελλάδα να επιτύχει τους δημοσιονομικούς της στόχους το 2012, αν και μάλλον όχι το 2011».
Σημειώνεται ότι η ύφεση της ελληνικής οικονομίας προβλέπεται ότι θα διαμορφωθεί στο 5,5% εφέτος και 2,8% το 2012. Για το έλλειμμα του προϋπολογισμού, προβλέπεται ότι θα διαμορφωθεί εφέτος στο 8,5% – 9% του ΑΕΠ και θα μειωθεί στο 7% το 2012 (έναντι 6,8% που προβλέπει το προσχέδιο του προϋπολογισμού) και το 5,3% το 2013. Στο πεδίο του χρέους εκτιμά ότι αν η Ελλάδα υλοποιήσει κατά γράμμα το μνημόνιο θα αρχίσει να μειώνεται μετά το 2013 ως αναλογία του ΑΕΠ.
Για το 2011 η κυβέρνηση υπολογίζει το χρέος στο 161,8% του ΑΕΠ και η τρόικα στο 162,8%. Το 2012 το χρέος αυξάνεται στο 172,7% σύμφωνα με την κυβέρνηση και στο 181% σύμφωνα με την τρόικα Την ώρα ωστόσο που ο συγκεντρωμένος λαός έστελνε τελεσίγραφο στην κυβέρνηση να μην ξεπουλήσει τις κατακτήσεις των εργαζομένων η Τρόικα ξεκάθαρα έθετε σε αμφισβήτηση, στο προσχέδιο της έκθεσής της, ακόμη και τον κατώτερο μισθό της εθνικής συλλογικής σύμβασης, κάτι που πρόσφατα είχε αρνηθεί ότι ζητούσε, ενώ προέτρεπε την κυβέρνηση να ανοίξει διάλογο με τους κοινωνικούς εταίρους με στόχο την επίτευξη συμφωνίας για όλα τα θέματα φωτιά.
Έκπληξη αποτελεί ότι στο κείμενο των 106 σελίδων αναφέρεται ρητά ότι εξαλείφεται η αρχή της ευνοϊκότερης ρύθμισης δηλαδή δεν θα υπερισχύει πλέον η ευνοϊκότερη για τον εργαζόμενο σύμβαση. Παγώνει επίσης η επέκταση των κλαδικών συμβάσεων τουλάχιστον μέχρι το τέλος του 2014 ενώ διευκολύνεται η υπογραφή επιχειρησιακών συμβάσεων και στις μικρές επιχειρήσεις καθώς διαπραγμάτευση θα γίνεται και με ενώσεις προσώπων.
Η αναφορά της τρόϊκας για την βιωσιμότητα του Ελληνικού χρέους
Το 2020 στην αγορά και άν..
Greece: Debt Sustainability Analysis - October 21, 2011
- Deposit accumulation. The size of the cash deposit buffer of the government remains at €11 billion, but this sum is now built up by end-2012 (versus mid-2014 in the 4th review). The deposit buffer represents one quarter worth of payments. It can also stand in for shortfalls in the ambitious program privatization targets.
Since
the fourth review, the situation in Greece has taken a turn for the
worse, with the economy increasingly adjusting through recession and
related wage-price channels, rather than through structural reform
driven increases in productivity. The authorities have also struggled to
meet their policy commitments against these headwinds. For the purpose of
the debt sustainability assessment, a revised baseline has been
specified, which takes into account the implications of these
developments for future growth and for likely policy outcomes. It has
been extended through 2030 to fully capture long term growth dynamics,
and possible financing implications.
The assessment shows that debt will remain high for the entire forecast horizon.
While it would decline at a slow rate given heavy official support at
low interest rates (through the EFSF as agreed at the July 21 Summit),
this trajectory is not robust to a range of shocks. Making debt
sustainable will require an ambitious combination of official support
and private sector involvement (PSI). Even with much stronger PSI, large
official sector support would be needed for an extended period. In this
sense, ultimately sustainability depends on the strength of the
official sector commitment to Greece.
A. Revised baseline
1. Recent developments call for a reassessment of the assumptions used for the debt sustainability analysis. Since
the fourth review, the situation in Greece has taken a turn for the
worse, with the economy increasingly adjusting through recession and
related wage-price channels, rather than through structural
reform-driven increases in productivity. The authorities have also
struggled to meet their policy commitments against these headwinds, and
due to administrative capacity limitations in the Greek government. The
growth and fiscal policy adjustments assumed under the program
individually have precedent in other countries’ experience, but
experience to date under the program suggests that Greece will not be
able to set a new precedent by realizing at the same time and from very
weak initial conditions a large internal devaluation, fiscal adjustment,
and privatization program.
2.
To give the debt sustainability analysis a firmer foundation, the
following set of more likely policy and macroeconomic outcomes has been
assumed (the financing and other assumptions are discussed in more
detail in Annex I):
-
A slower recovery. In keeping with experience to date under the
program, it is assumed that Greece takes longer to implement structural
reforms, and that a longer timeframe is necessary for them to yield
macroeconomic dividends (e.g. due to complementarities). A longer and
more severe recession is thus assumed, with output contracting by 5½
percent in 2011, and by 3 percent in 2012. Growth then averages about 1¼
percent per year in 2013-14, 2⅔ percent in 2015-20 (as a cyclical
rebound kicks in, and structural reforms start to pay off); and 1⅔
percent per year in 2021-30 (as the economy reverts to potential growth,
which is constrained by demographic trends). All told, real output
growth is projected to be cumulatively 7¼ percent lower through 2020,
versus the projections made at the time of the 4th Review.
-
Lower privatization proceeds. Given the adverse market conditions and
technical constraints faced by Greece, a more conservative but still
suitably ambitious path is assumed for privatization proceeds for the
purpose of the debt sustainability analysis. Receipts rise from 1½
percent of GDP in 2012 to 2 percent of GDP for the period 2013-14, and
peak at 2½ percent of GDP during 2015-17. They fall back at 2 percent of
GDP per year for 2018-20. Through 2020, total privatization proceeds
would amount to €46 billion, instead of the €66 billion assumed in the
program (i.e. the original target of €50 billion plus an additional
amount reflecting the fact that bank recapitalization will likely create
additional assets to be disposed of).
-
Reduced fiscal adjustment needs. The nominal fiscal targets are
maintained through the program (mid-2013) and after that, the primary
surplus is assumed to improve further until it reaches 4½ percent of GDP
for the period 2014-16. The primary surplus steps down to 4¼ percent of
GDP in 2017-20 and to 4 percent of GDP in 2021-25 (a level which in the
past Greece has been able to sustain). Since few countries have been
able to sustain a 4 percent primary surplus, it is assumed that from
2026 onwards, the primary surplus is maintained at 3½ percent of GDP.
Under this path, which requires sustained and unwavering commitment to
fiscal prudence by the Greek authorities, the overall fiscal balance
would not drop below 3 percent of GDP until 2020.
-
Delayed access to market financing. The PSI agreed at the July 21
Summit is assumed to be put into place. The issue of when market
financing will be restored is inherently uncertain. For the purposes of
this analysis, new market financing is assumed to become available only
once Greece has achieved 3 years of growth, three years of primary
surpluses above the debt stabilizing level, and once debt drops below
150 percent of GDP. This is admittedly an arbitrary rule, and is used
for illustrative purposes to give an indication of the scale of official
support that could be needed to fill any financing gap until market
access is restored in 2021.
3.
Under these assumptions, Greece’s debt peaks at very high levels and
would decline at a very slow rate pointing to the need for further debt
relief to ensure sustainability.
Debt
(net of collateral required for PSI) would peak at 186 percent of GDP
in 2013 and decline only to 152 percent of GDP by end-2020 and to 130
percent of GDP by end-2030. The financing package agreed on July
21(especially lower rates on EFSF loans) does help the debt trajectory,
but its impact is more than offset by the revised macro and policy
framework. Greece would not return
to the market until 2021 under the market access assumptions used, and
cumulatively official additional financing needs (beyond what remains in
the present program, and including the eventual rollover of existing
official loans) could amount to some €252 billion from the present
through to 2020.
4.
Stress tests to this revised baseline illuminate further the problem
with sustainability, revealing that the downward debt trajectory would
not be robust to shocks:
All
else unchanged, significant shortfalls relative to the revised fiscal
and privatization targets would deteriorate debt dynamics even further:
-
Lower primary balances. If due to policy slippages, the primary balance
gets stuck at any level below 2½ percent of GDP (a level which under
the program would only be exceeded in 2013), debt would be on an
increasing trajectory from already very high levels. (At the time of the
fourth review, the debt stabilizing primary balance was calculated to
be 3.8 percent of GDP; under the revised baseline, largely due to the
reduction in the average interest rate on public debt, the debt
stabilizing primary balance is 2¼ percent of GDP.)
-
Shortfalls with privatization receipts. Failures with privatization
(only €10 of €46 billion realized), would have a significant impact on
the level of debt and the debt trajectory (noticeably slowing the rate
of decline). Debt would end at 169 percent of GDP by end-2020 and 153
percent of GDP by end-2030 (without additional fiscal adjustment to
compensate for higher interest payments). With market access unlikely,
financing gaps would arise (further testing the willingness of the
official sector to provide additional financing).
Permanent growth and interest rates shocks can lead to unsustainable debt dynamics:
-
Growth. Results can be very sensitive to growth outcomes. Fixing the
primary balance, permanently lower growth (-1 percentage point each
year) would render debt clearly unsustainable, while higher growth (+1
percentage point each year) would lead debt to fall to just under 130
percent of GDP by 2020. Allowing fiscal feedbacks—with higher growth
making it easier to sustain a higher fiscal adjustment and lower growth
making it easier to fall permanently short of targeted adjustment
levels—would reinforce these outcomes. There is also a second
endogeneity at play, whereby strong growth will be very hard to achieve
unless Greece’s high debt overhang is decisively tackled. Overall, the
scenario emphasizes the crucial importance of frontloading
growth-enhancing structural reforms for debt sustainability.
-
Spreads and Bund rates. If new market access would take place at
slightly different levels, this would not have a large impact on the
debt level. For example, if return to markets is at 150 bps higher than
the baseline but primary balances are unchanged, debt-to-GDP levels
would be only slightly different by 2030. Essentially, Greece is not in
the market in this scenario until late the second decade, limiting the
need for new market financing, and thus the impact of interest rates.
However, higher Bund rates, which would affect the rates for the heavy
volume of official borrowing, would limit the debt decline in the second
decade once potential growth starts to slow down and result in debt
stabilizing at a very high level (about 150 percent of GDP).
- A
combined shock - to represent a scenario of strong internal devaluation
enforced by a much deeper recession—would sharply raise debt in the
near term.
To
model this it is assumed that through much deeper recession and
deflation the competitiveness gap is unwound by 2017, instead of during
the next decade. The headwinds from the deeper recession are assumed to
delay the achievement of fiscal and privatization policy targets by
three years. As the economy rapidly shrinks, debt would reach extremely
high levels in the short run at 208 percent of GDP. If Greece could
weather the shock to confidence this could create, the eventual more
rapid recovery of the economy would help bring debt back down towards
the revised baseline path, but it would remain at a very high level in
2020 (173 percent of GDP).. Market access would not likely be restored
until 2027 (under the assumptions on access used, in particular the 150
percent of GDP debt threshold). Cumulative additional financing needs
(including rollover of existing official debt) could approach €450
billion.
5.
Making Greek debt sustainable requires an appropriate combination of
new official support on generous terms and additional debt relief from
private creditors:
-
Large, long-term, and sufficiently generous official support will be
necessary for Greece to remain current on its debt service payments and
to facilitate a declining debt trajectory. The commitments given at the
July 21 Summit—that euro area partners would continue to support
countries under adjustment programs, like Greece, for as long as it
takes to regain market access (provided the program is implemented) -
represent an important breakthrough, and the credibility of this
commitment is critical to a sustainable Greek debt position. The revised
baseline does indeed rely on additional official support beyond the
amounts tabled during the July 21 Summit, to give the Greek government
time to adjust until market access is successfully restored. As noted,
the precise timing of market re-access is inherently uncertain. Under
the assumptions used, the time required to get back to market could be
significant, generating a potential need for additional official
financing ranging up to €440 billion (i.e. under the worst case of the
scenarios studied here, the faster macro adjustment shock).
- Deeper PSI,
which is now being contemplated, also has a vital role in establishing
the sustainability of Greece’s debt1. To assess the potential magnitude
of improvements in the debt trajectory, and potential implications for
official financing, illustrative scenarios can be considered using
discount bonds with an assumed yield of 6 percent and no collateral. The
results show that debt can be brought to just above120 percent of GDP
by end-2020 if 50 percent discounts are applied. Given still-delayed
market access, large scale additional official financing requirements
would remain, estimated at some €114 billion (under the market access
assumptions used). To get the debt down further would require a
larger private sector contribution (for instance, to reduce debt below
110 percent of GDP by 2020 would require a face value reduction of at
least 60 percent and/or more concessional official sector financing
terms). Additional official financing requirements could be reduced
to an estimated €109 billion in this instance. Of course, it must be
noted that the estimated costs to the official sector exclude any
contagion-related costs.
(Footnote 1: The ECB does not agree with the inclusion of these illustrative scenarios concerning a deeper PSI in this report.)
Appendix I: Financing and other assumptions of the DSA Exercise
1. The financing and other assumptions underpinning the revised baseline are as follows:
Financing assumptions.
These have been updated, versus the fourth review, to reflect the
agreements reached at the July 21 Summit. Thus, going forward, EFSF
financing is assumed to be provided at 100 bps above the German 10-year
Bund rate (rising from 4 percent in 2012 to 4.7 percent by 2016); PSI is
completed on the July 21 parameters, but participation is assumed to
fall short of 90 percent, and almost all of the debt is assumed to be
exchanged for par bonds (involving about €35 billion in collateral
financed by the EFSF). Some €33 billion of post-2020 bonds are assumed
bought back (using €20 billion in financing provided by the EFSF). IMF
exposure remains under SBA terms with €30 billion in total access.
Greece is assumed to return to the market at spreads falling from 500
bps to 250 bps by 2020 (with the spread contained by much lower rollover
requirements over the medium-term, and by the potential availability of
additional EFSF financing, consistent with euro-zone leaders pledge to
support Greece for as long as it takes for Greece to return to markets).
Other Policy assumptions
-
Bank recapitalization/HFSF funding. Total additional banking sector
support needs are preliminary calculated to amount to €20 billion,
bringing total HFSF needs to some €30 billion. The additional financing
is needed to provision for losses on banks’ private loan portfolios and
on their government bond holdings.
-
Arrears clearance. This is assumed to apply to end-2010 arrears for an
amount of €4.5 billion (compared with €5.1 billion in end-March arrears
used for the 4th Review). Arrears clearance has been frontloaded
compared to the 4th Review assumptions: state budget arrears are assumed
cleared by Q1 2012, while hospital, legal entity, social security fund
and local government arrears are paid down in 2012.
- Deposit accumulation. The size of the cash deposit buffer of the government remains at €11 billion, but this sum is now built up by end-2012 (versus mid-2014 in the 4th review). The deposit buffer represents one quarter worth of payments. It can also stand in for shortfalls in the ambitious program privatization targets.
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