Όλες οι "καυτές" αποκαλύψεις του WikiLeaks...(Κόσμος)

• U/S BURNS’ AUGUST 17 MEETING WITH ISRAELI MOSSAD
• Secret EU plot to boycott Ahmadinejad inauguration
• TURKEY: A/S GORDON PRESSES FM DAVUTOGLU ON IRAN
• Η Κίνα και η Google 
• Η εξαφάνιση της Βόρειας Κορέας 
• Μπερλουσκόνι – Πούτιν 
• Η «προστασία» από την Υεμένη 
• Ανταλλαγή κρατουμένων του Γκουαντάναμο 
• "Λίγος" για τους Αμερικανούς ο Ερντογάν- Φιλόδοξος ο Νταβούτογλου 
• Τρελός ο Τσάβες

U/S BURNS’ AUGUST 17 MEETING WITH ISRAELI MOSSAD
Friday, 31 August 2007, 12:45
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TEL AVIV 002652
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/24/2017
TAGS PREL, PTER, MARR, MASS, KNNP, UNSC, PK, IR, IZ, ZP“>ZP,
JO, EG, RS“>RS, CH, LE, SY, IS
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS’ AUGUST 17 MEETING WITH ISRAELI MOSSAD
CHIEF MEIR DAGAN
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d).

THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE MOU AND ISRAEL’S QME

——————————————–

3. (S) Dagan observed that the signing of the MOU on security assistance could not have come at a better time, and stressed that Israel appreciated America’s support. The Under Secretary agreed about the timing, noting that the U.S., Israel and like-minded countries were facing multiple threats around the world, and that the Middle East is a very dangerous region. He said that the MOU serves as a concrete reminder that the U.S. stands by its long-term security commitments to its friends, and is ready to help them with their needs. The Under Secretary noted that the Middle East is now at the heart of American interests. Because Egypt also plays a vital role in the region, the U.S. would also renew its security assistance commitment to that country. U.S. relations with the Gulf states were longstanding, and America would stay true to those friendships, as well. The Under Secretary stressed that the USG is committed to Israel’s QME. He noted that the majority of systems and equipment that the U.S. would sell to Egypt and other Arab partners would replace items that had been sold to those countries in the past.

——————————————-

DAGAN REVIEWS MIDDLE EAST, PAKISTAN, TURKEY

——————————————-

4. (S) Assessing the region, Dagan said Israel sees itself in the middle of a rapidly changing environment, in which the fate of one Middle Eastern country is connected to another. Dagan then said he was concerned about how long Pakistani President Musharraf would survive: “He is facing a serious problem with the militants. Pakistan’s nuclear capability could end up in the hands of an Islamic regime.” Turning to Iran, Dagan observed that it is in a transition period. There is debate among the leadership between Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad and their respective supporters. Instability in Iran is driven by inflation and tension among ethnic minorities. This, Dagan said, presents unique opportunities, and Israelis and Americans might see a change in Iran in

TEL AVIV 00002652 002 OF 005

their lifetimes. As for Iraq, it may end up a weak, federal state comprised of three cantons or entities, one each belonging to the Kurds, Sunnis and Shias.

5. (S) Dagan said that the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia are concerned about the growing importance of Iran and its influence on them. They are taking precautions, trying to increase their own military defensive capabilities. Referring to the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD), Dagan warned that these countries would not be able to cope with the amount of weapons systems they intend to acquire: “They do not use the weapons effectively.”

6. (S) Dagan said that Jordan has successfully faced down threats from the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, and that Egypt is struggling with the question of who will replace President Mubarak. He said he sees no hope for the Palestinians, and that Israel looks at Syria and Lebanon, and sees only instability. Further afield, it looks at Turkey and sees Islamists gaining momentum there. The question, he asked, is how long Turkey’s military — viewing itself as the defender of Turkey’s secular identity — will remain quiet.

7. (S) If Israel’s neighborhood were not unstable enough, Dagan observed, it did not help that Russia is playing a “very negative role” in the region. He observed that all of these challenges have to be addressed globally — they could not be dealt with individually. Returning to Jordan as an example, he noted that the more than one million Iraqi refugees in Jordan were changing Jordanian society, and forcing it into a new relationship with Saudi Arabia. This is evidenced by Saudi King Abdullah’s recent visit to Jordan, which implies greater understanding between the Jordanians and the Saudis.

—————————————-

DISCUSSION OF THE GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE

—————————————-

8. (S) Turning to the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD), Dagan said that enhancing the capabilities of the Gulf states “is the right direction to go,” especially as they are afraid of Iran. Such a U.S. commitment will be a stabilizing factor in the region. Dagan clarified that he would not oppose U.S. security assistance to America’s Arab partners. He expressed concern, nevertheless, about the current policies of those partners — especially with regards to Syria and Iran. Dagan added that if those countries must choose between buying defensive systems from the U.S. or France, then he would prefer they buy systems from the U.S., as this would bring them closer to the U.S.

9. (S) Dagan observed that the challenge facing the U.S. now is how to unite the Gulf states under a shared policy, and pointed to Qatar as the weakest link in the chain, trying to play all sides. Under Secretary Burns replied that the U.S. is trying to get Qatar and its neighbors to look at issues from a regional perspective, and to focus on threats in a unified way. Acting PM Assistant Secretary Mull expressed understanding for Israel’s frustration with how the region looked, but stressed nevertheless that if America did not engage the Gulf states through the GSD, the situation would become much worse. It is critical to get the Gulf states focused on the Iran threat, and to adopt a regional approach to countering it. Encouraging and supporting their counterproliferation efforts would be crucial. Dagan said he agreed with this approach, stressing that the threat of radical Islam is real.

——————————————— —-

IRAN: DAGAN REVIEWS ISRAEL’S FIVE PILLAR STRATEGY

——————————————— —-

10. (S) Dagan led discussion on Iran by pointing out that the U.S. and Israel have different timetables concerning when Iran is likely to acquire a nuclear capability. He clarified that the Israel Atomic Energy Commission’s (IAEC) timetable is purely technical in nature, while the Mossad’s considers other factors, including the regime’s determination to succeed. While Dagan acknowledged that there is still time to “resolve” the Iran nuclear crisis, he stressed that Iran is making a great effort to achieve a nuclear capability: “The threat is obvious, even if we have a different timetable. If we want to postpone their acquisition of a

TEL AVIV 00002652 003 OF 005

nuclear capability, then we have to invest time and effort ourselves.”

11. (S) Dagan described how the Israeli strategy consists of five pillars:

A) Political Approach: Dagan praised efforts to bring Iran before the UNSC, and signaled his agreement with the pursuit of a third sanctions resolution. He acknowledged that pressure on Iran is building up, but said this approach alone will not resolve the crisis. He stressed that the timetable for political action is different than the nuclear project’s timetable.

B) Covert Measures: Dagan and the Under Secretary agreed not to discuss this approach in the larger group setting.

C) Counterproliferation: Dagan underscored the need to prevent know-how and technology from making their way to Iran, and said that more can be done in this area.

D) Sanctions: Dagan said that the biggest successes had so far been in this area. Three Iranian banks are on the verge of collapse. The financial sanctions are having a nationwide impact. Iran’s regime can no longer just deal with the bankers themselves.

E) Force Regime Change: Dagan said that more should be done to foment regime change in Iran, possibly with the support of student democracy movements, and ethnic groups (e.g., Azeris, Kurds, Baluchs) opposed to the ruling regime.

12. (S) Dagan clarified that the U.S., Israel and like-minded countries must push on all five pillars at the same time. Some are bearing fruit now; others would bear fruit in due time, especially if more attention were placed on them. Dagan urged more attention on regime change, asserting that more could be done to develop the identities of ethnic minorities in Iran. He said he was sure that Israel and the U.S. could “change the ruling regime in Iran, and its attitude towards backing terror regimes.” He added, “We could also get them to delay their nuclear project. Iran could become a normal state.”

13. (S) Dagan stressed that Iran has weak spots that can be exploited. According to his information, unemployment exceeds 30 percent nationwide, with some towns and villages experiencing 50 percent unemployment, especially among 17-30 year olds. Inflation averages more than 40 percent, and people are criticizing the government for investing in and sponsoring Hamas, saying that they government should invest in Iran itself. “The economy is hurting,” he said, “and this is provoking a real crisis among Iran’s leaders.” He added that Iran’s minorities are “raising their heads, and are tempted to resort to violence.”

14. (S) Dagan suggested that more could be done to get the Europeans to take a tougher stand against Iran. Under Secretary Burns agreed, and suggested that Israel could help

SIPDIS by reaching out to the Europeans. Dagan said that Israel is already doing this, and would continue to do so. Dagan reiterated the need to strike at Iran’s heart by engaging with its people directly. Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts are important, but more radio transmissions in Farsi are needed. Coordination with the Gulf states is helpful, but the U.S. should also coordinate with Azerbaijan and countries to the north of Iran, to put pressure on Iran. Russia, he said, would be annoyed, but it would be fitting, as Russia appears bent on showing the U.S. that it cannot act globally without considering Russia.

15. (S) Under Secretary Burns stressed that the USG is focused on Iran not only because of its nuclear program, but also because it supports terrorism and Shiite militias in Iraq. The U.S. approach is currently focused on the diplomatic track and increasing pressure on Iran through sanctions. Work in the UNSC helps to define the Iranian nuclear threat as one that affects international security, and not just that of Israel. While UNSC members Russia, China and Qatar will water down efforts to increase pressure on Iran, it is still worthwhile to push for a third sanctions resolution. In the meantime, the U.S. will encourage the Europeans, Japan and South Korea to implement unilateral sanctions against Iran outside the UNSC framework. The U.S.

TEL AVIV 00002652 004 OF 005

will continue to encourage banks and financial institutions to slow down their operations in Iran and financially isolate it. Regarding military pressure, the Under Secretary noted that the U.S. has deployed 1-2 carrier battle groups in the Gulf over the last six months, and that President Bush has stated that he will interrupt Iran’s activity in Iraq. As for outreach to the Iranian people, the VOA is now broadcasting programs in Farsi, and the USG is trying to get more Iranian students to visit the U.S. to promote people-to-people relations.

—————————————–

PAKISTAN: ISRAEL WORRIED ABOUT MUSHARRAF

—————————————–

16. (S) On Pakistan, Dagan said that President Musharraf is losing control, and that some of his coalition partners could threaten him in the future. The key question, Dagan said, is whether Musharraf retains his commander-in-chief role in addition to his role as president. If not, he will have problems. Dagan observed that there has been an increase in the number of attempts on Musharraf’s life, and wondered whether he will survive the next few years. Under Secretary Burns replied that South Asia has assumed vital importance in American foreign policy since September 11. The U.S. is committed to denying Afghanistan as a safe-haven for Taliban and Al-Qaeda activity. The USG will continue to support Pakistani President Musharraf, and is seeking to boost his military defensive capabilities. At the same time, the U.S. is encouraging Pakistan and Afghanistan to work with each other militarily. Turning to India, Under Secretary Burns noted that U.S.-Indian economic cooperation is growing, and that the USG is working effectively to reduce tensions between India and Pakistan.

—————————–

LEBANON: DAGAN URGES CAUTION

—————————–

17. (S) Dagan urged caution with respect to Lebanon, noting that the results of efforts there to bolster the Siniora government would impact Syria and Iraq. The U.S. and Israel, he said, are on the edge of achieving something in Lebanon, and so cannot afford to drop their guard. What is necessary is finding the right way to support PM Siniora. “He is a courageous man,” Dagan said. Syria, Iran and Hizballah are working hard against him. Dagan noted that much of what is animating the leadership of Lebanon to take on Syria is personal: “Hariri, Jumblat and others had their parents executed by the Syrians.” This anti-Syrian sentiment has forged an alliance based on personal and national interests. Siniora has worked well with the situation, but Dagan suggested that the odds are against him. Under Secretary Burns replied that the U.S. is trying to give PM Siniora as much support as possible, and that we would continue to consult closely with Israel on Lebanon. He noted that he would return to Israel in October.

——————–

MEETING PARTICIPANTS

——————–

18, (SBU) Accompanying Under Secretary Burns in the meeting were: — Ambassador Richard H. Jones — Acting PM Assistant Secretary Stephen Mull — Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Mary Beth Long — NEA/IPA Deputy Director Nicole Shampaine — Embassy Tel Aviv Counselor for Political Research — Embassy Tel Aviv Political-Military Officer (notetaker)

19. (SBU) Accompanying Mossad Chief Meir Dagan in the meeting were: — Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Salai Meridor — Advisor to Foreign Minister Livni Omer Caspi — Two unidentified Mossad officials

20. (U) Under Secretary R. Nicholas Burns cleared on this cable.

********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv’s Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

TEL AVIV 00002652 005 OF 005

You can also access this site through the State Department’s Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ********************
JONES


TURKEY: A/S GORDON PRESSES FM DAVUTOGLU ON IRAN

TAGS KNNP, PREL, TU, IR
SUBJECT: TURKEY: A/S GORDON PRESSES FM DAVUTOGLU ON IRAN
REF: ANKARA 1626
Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4(b,d)

1. (S) Iran dominated A/S Gordon’s 40-minute meeting November 12 with Foreign Minister Davutoglu. The FM had just gotten off the phone with El-Baradei and had discussed in detail the IAEA proposal to send Iran’s low enriched uranium to Turkey. El-Baradei had said he would “call Washington” that same morning. This had followed two long “harsh” sessions with the Iranians in Istanbul on Sunday evening. The Iranians have said they are willing to meet with Solana, but have told the Turks that they have serious problems with Cooper and the British. They have “more trust” in the U.S. The Iranians would also prefer to get fuel from the U.S. rather than the Russians.

2. (S) Davutoglu said the Iranians: a) are ready to send a delegation to Vienna to work out the specifics on this proposal; b) have given their “full trust” to Turkey; c) continue to face serious domestic problems inside Iran. He said the Turks actually see Ahmadinejad as “more flexible” than others who are inside the Iranian Government. Ahmadinejad is facing “huge pressure” after statements from some P5 members to the effect that a nuclear deal would succeed in weakening Iran,s nuclear capability — which is interpreted by some circles in Iran as a virtual defeat.

3. (S) Given this context, the Turks had asked Ahmadinejad if the core of the issue is psychological rather than substance. Ahmadinejad had said “yes,” that the Iranians agree to the proposal but need to manage the public perception. Accordingly, the Iranians are proposing that the first 400 kilos be transferred to Kish Island — thereby keeping it on Iranian soil — and would receive right away an equivalent amount (30-50 kilos) of enriched fuel. The second stage would focus on the management of Iranian public opinion, after which Tehran would proceed with the Turkey option for the remaining 800 kilos, probably in two tranches. Davutoglu said Baradei agreed to consider this.

4. (S) Davutoglu noted that he had spoken to NSA General Jones Wednesday, who had said that we should perhaps suggest to the Iranians that they transfer 600 kilos to Kish Island and 600 kilos to Turkey simultaneously. A/S Gordon said he could not give an official response to the proposal as this is the first time we heard it, but that he anticipates much skepticism about providing fuel to Iran before all the LEU has been taken out. It would be better to get all 1200 kilos out right away.

5. (C) Davutoglu noted that these are two different proposals. The first is Iran’s request for fuel for its nuclear reactor. Even if this takes place, he said, we still need to work on limiting Iran’s nuclear enrichment capability. If we succeed with this proposal, he said, it will create “confidence” and a “new momentum” and would allow room for negotiation.

6. (C) Noting that Davutoglu had only addressed the negative consequences of sanctions or the use of military force, Gordon pressed Davutoglu on Ankara’s assessment of the consequences if Iran gets a nuclear weapon. Davutoglu gave a spirited reply, that “of course” Turkey was aware of this risk. This is precisely why Turkey is working so hard with the Iranians. President Gul himself had spent two hours Sunday with Ahmadinejad in Istanbul.

7. (C) Gordon noted that while we acknowledge that Turkey can be helpful as a mediator, some of the Prime Minister’s recent public comments raise questions about how Turkey sees this issue. Davutoglu said he is aware of these concerns, but contended that the Guardian newspaper had not accurately presented its recent interview with the Prime Minister. The PM’s comments had been taken out of context. Erdogan had been asked if he views Iran as a friend. If he had said “no,” it would not have been possible to convince Tehran to cooperate on this latest proposal. Only Turkey can speak bluntly and critically to the Iranians, Davutoglu contended, but only because Ankara is showing public messages of friendship.

8. (C) Gordon pushed back that Ankara should give a stern public message about the consequences if UN resolutions are ignored. Davutoglu countered that Erdogan had given just such a statement in Tehran when he visited. He emphasized that Turkey’s foreign policy is giving a “sense of justice” and a “sense of vision” to the region. Turkey has provided a “third option” in addition to Iran and the Saudis (who he contended are viewed as “puppets” of the US). The result, he said, is that we “limit Iranian influence in the region.” We

ANKARA 00001654 002 OF 002

need a “pro-Western approach AND a sense of justice.”

9. (C) A/S Gordon has cleared this cable.

JEFFREY

“Visit Ankara’s Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey”



Secret EU plot to boycott Ahmadinejad inauguration

European Union ambassadors in Tehran jointly agreed to boycott the inauguration of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president after the disputed election in 2009 but kept the plan secret from the Iranian authorities to ensure their invitations were not withdrawn in advance.

France’s top Middle East official told US diplomats in Paris: “It’s hard to keep a secret when 27 nations are involved but we are trying,” according to a secret diplomatic cable In the end only Sweden, then running the EU presidency, was represented by an ambassador. All other member states sent less senior officials.

But Jean-Christophe Paucelle sounded “defensive” when he explained that all EU envoys would still attend a separate inauguration ceremony in the Iranian parliament, admitting that the issue had generated “tense and fractious” debate among European foreign ministers. “We are caught between two conflicting objectives,” Paucelle explained.

“On the one hand we want to communicate that we do not approve of this illegitimate election. On the other hand we need to be realistic: power is in the hands of (supreme leader) Khameini and Ahmadinejad, including the nuclear file, and we must negotiate with those in power. You are in the same position.”

The US has not had an embassy in Tehran since diplomatic relations were severed after the 1979 overthrow of the Shah and the Islamic revolution.

Paucelle said the EU would continue to respect what he described as “the Durban red lines” – dating back to the 2001 anti-racism conference in South Africa that had been hostile to Israel. “We will walk right out if Ahmadinejad denies the Holocaust or declares that his regime will destroy Israel.”

Paucelle admitted that since non-Muslims had never before received an invitation to an inauguration ceremony presided over by Iran’s supreme leader, EU diplomats in Tehran had never entered the building where the event was to take place and were not sure about the practicalities of walking out if they needed to. “They are worried that the doors may be locked,” he said.

The British ambassador, Simon Gass, also attended the 5 August parliamentary event, though as a recent arrival in Tehran he had not yet formally presented his diplomatic credentials. “The Iranians are desperate for recognition and so they have disregarded their usual devotion to protocol – and their anti-British vitriol – on this occasion,” the French official reported.

Ανανέωση 2:38

Έγγραφα του Στέιτ Ντιπάρτμεντ που δημοσιοποιήθηκαν από το WikiLeaks περιέχουν ευαίσθητες πληροφορίες για τη διεθνή τρομοκρατία, τη διασπορά πυρηνικών όπλων και τις δράσεις ξένων ηγετών, ανακοίνωσαν το βράδυ της Κυριακής οι New York Times και ο Guardian.

Οι πιέσεις αραβικών χωρών για στρατιωτική επέμβαση στο Ιράν, οι ανησυχίες για το πυρηνικό οπλοστάσιο του Πακιστάν και η αμερικανική κατασκοπεία σε βάρος του ΟΗΕ είναι μερικές από τις σημαντικότερες αποκαλύψεις.

Πάνω από 250.000 έγγραφα, τα οποία είχαν σταλεί στο αμερικανικό υπουργείο Άμυνας από πρεσβείες των ΗΠΑ σε όλο τον κόσμο, αναμένεται να αποκαλυφθούν σταδιακά στη μεγαλύτερη διαρροή απόρρητων πληροφοριών που έχει γίνει ποτέ.

Όπως συνέβη νωρίτερα φέτος με τα ημερολόγια του Αφγανιστάν και του Ιράκ, αποσπάσματα των εγγράφων δημοσιεύονται στους New York Times, τον Guardian και τον Spiegel. Στην αποκάλυψη συμμετέχουν αυτή τη φορά και η El Pais και η Le Monde, η οποία ανακοίνωσε ότι θα δημοσιεύσει περισσότερες πληροφορίες τη Δευτέρα.

Και οι πέντε εφημερίδες συμφώνησαν να μην δημοσιεύσουν όλα τα έγγραφα ως έχουν και να μην αποκαλύψουν ονόματα.

Λίγη ώρα πριν αρχίσει η αποκάλυψη, οι υπεύθυνοι του διαβόητου δικτυακού τόπου ανακοίνωσαν ότι ο λογαριασμός του στο Twitter δέχεται κυβερνοεπίθεση με την τακτική DoS (άρνηση παροχής υπηρεσιών λόγω υπερφόρτωσης του συστήματος από αιτήματα σύνδεσης).

Την ίδια ώρα, τo αμερικανικό Πεντάγωνο επέκρινε το δικτυακό τόπο για την «απερίσκεπτη» διαρροή, η οποία «θέτει σε κίνδυνο ζωές», και ανακοίνωσε ότι λαμβάνει μέτρα για να αποτρέψει ανάλογα περιστατικά στο μέλλον.

«Παγκόσμια διπλωματική κρίση»
Σύμφωνα με τους New York Times, τα αμερικανικά έγγραφα δείχνουν ότι τρομοκρατικές οργανώσεις όπως η Αλ Κάιντα εξακολουθούν να βασίζονται σε Σαουδάραβες χρηματοδότες.

Η Σαουδική Αραβία και άλλες αραβικές χώρες φέρονται επίσης να άσκησαν πιέσεις στις ΗΠΑ για στρατιωτική επέμβαση κατά του Ιράν.

Ωστόσο, ο Αμερικανός υπουργός Άμυνας Ρόμπερτ Γκέιτς φέρεται να πιστεύει ότι μια στρατιωτική επιχείρηση στο Ιράν θα καθυστερούσε για μόλις ένα με τρία χρόνια την ανάπτυξη πυρηνικών όπλων από τη χώρα.

Τα έγγραφα δείχνουν επίσης ότι η Τεχεράνη έχει προμηθευτεί από τη Βόρειο Κορέα πυραύλους που θα μπορούσαν να πλήξουν τη Δυτική Ευρώπη. Οι ΗΠΑ ανησυχούν ότι τα όπλα αυτά θα επιτρέψουν τελικά την ανάπτυξη πυραύλων ακόμα μεγαλύτερου βεληνεκούς.

Σύμφωνα επίσης με τις πληροφορίες των New York Times, η κινεζική κυβέρνηση φέρεται να είχε εξαπολύσει κυβερνοεπίθεση εναντίον των ΗΠΑ και των συμμάχων τους.

Την ίδια ώρα, ο Guardian κάνει λόγο για «παγκόσμια διπλωματική κρίση». Η βρετανική εφημερίδα «είναι σε θέση να αποκαλύψει ότι Άραβες ηγέτες πιέζουν μυστικά για αεροπορική επιχείρηση στο Ιράν, και ότι αξιωματούχοι των ΗΠΑ έχουν λάβει οδηγίες να κατασκοπεύουν την ηγεσία του ΟΗΕ».

Άλλες αποκαλύψεις για τις οποίες γράφει ο Guardian:

• Ουάσινγκτον και Λονδίνο ανησυχούν ότι το πυρηνικό οπλοστάσιο του Πακιστάν δεν είναι ασφαλές
• Η ρωσική κυβέρνηση φέρεται να έχει διασυνδέσεις με το οργανωμένο έγκλημα
• Σφοδρές αμερικανικές επικρίσεις στις βρετανικές στρατιωτικές επιχειρήσεις στο Αφγανιστάν
• Ισχυρισμοί για ανάρμοστη συμπεριφορά από μέλος της βρετανικής βασιλικής οικογένειας

Στα έγγραφα υπάρχουν επίσης αναφορές για αρκετούς ξένους ηγέτες:

• Ο Ρώσος πρωθυπουργός Βλαντιμίρ Πούτιν είναι «κυρίαρχος αρσενικός σκύλος»
• Ο Σίλβιο Μπερλουσκόνι κάνει «άγρια πάρτι»
• Η Άνγκελα Μέρκελ «αποφεύγει τα ρίσκα αλλά είναι σχετικά δημιουργική»
• Ο Αφγανός πρόεδρος Χαμίντ Καρζάι είναι «παρανοϊκός»
• Ο Νικολά Σαρκοζί είναι «γυμνός αυτοκράτορας»
• Ο Ιρανός πρόεδρος Αχμαντινετζάντ παρομοιάζεται με τον Αδόλφο Χίτλερ
• Ο Λίβυος ηγέτης Μουαμάρ Καντάφι, τέλος, συνοδεύεται παντού από μια «φιλήδονη ξανθιά νοσοκόμα» από την Ουκρανία

Ο Guardian δημοσιεύει στο δικτυακό τόπο του χάρτη με τις χώρες για τις οποίες υπάρχουν αναφορές στα επίμαχα έγγραφα.

Η Ελλάδα απουσιάζει από το χάρτη. Σύμφωνα όμως με τον αντίστοιχο χάρτη του Spiegel, η διαρροή περιλαμβάνει και σχετικά λίγα έγγραφα που είχαν σταλεί από την αμερικανική πρεσβεία στην Αθήνα.

Οι πρεσβείες που είχαν στείλει τα περισσότερα έγγραφα είναι αυτές στην Άγκυρα, τη Βαγδάτη, το Αμμάν, το Κουβέιτ και το Τόκιο.

THE PROBLEM FOR THE US
Επειδή ότι και να κάνουμε η μετάφραση θα χάσει...
(όποιος έχει χρόνο ας το κάνει, αν και το συγκεκριμένο θα μεταφραστεί τις επόμενες μέρες νομίζουμε!)Διαβάστε το στα Αγγλικά!Turkey's new foreign policy is a mixed bag for us.
Having regional heavyweights take on burdens, thereby
relieving us, has long been a desired goal of US policy, but
it comes with a certain loss of control. Nevertheless, on a
whole host of key issues of supreme importance to us -- ...
Afghanistan and Pakistan, cooperation in and on Iraq, NATO
efforts (although a leading Turkish role in Missile Defense
will not be easy) -- Turkey is a crucial ally, and our use of
Incirlik, Habur gate, and Turkish airspace for our Iraq and
Afghanistan operations is indispensible. Its "zero
conflicts" initiatives, which have moved Turkey forward on
more of the key bilateral spats -- Cyprus, Greece, Kurds,
Northern Iraq, Armenia -- than we have seen with any other
Turkish government, also support U.S. interests.

Nevertheless, these latter issues illustrate two
problems. At least in Turkish eyes, on this complex of
issues the US , especially the media, interest groups, and
Congress, default to a "blame Turkey" posture regardless of
whatever it does. Second, Turkey has repeatedly run into
trouble actually consummating these various openings -- the
Armenian protocols being the best example, but continued
overflights of Greek islands and domestic opposition to the
Kurdish opening are also relevant. What we fear is that this
inability to bring to conclusion foreign policy initiatives
will affect not just the above, but most Turkish policy,
given the over-extension of Davutoglu and his team, and
a tendency to substitute rhetoric for long term investment of
diplomatic, military, and assistance capital. (Fortunately,
Afghanistan/Pakistan and Iraq are the two major exceptions to
this tendency.)

The greatest potential strategic problem for the US,
however, and the one that has some of the commentators
howling, is the Turks neo-Ottoman posturing around the Middle
East and Balkans. This "back to the past" attitude so clear
in Davutoglu's Sarajevo speech, combined with the Turks'
tendency to execute it through alliances with more Islamic or
more worrisome local actors, constantly creates new problems.
Part of this is structural. Despite their success and
relative power, the Turks really can't compete on equal terms
with either the US or regional "leaders" (EU in the Balkans,
Russia in the Caucasus/Black Sea, Saudis, Egyptians and even
Iranians in the ME). With Rolls Royce ambitions but Rover
resources, to cut themselves in on the action the Turks have
to "cheat" by finding an underdog (this also plays to
Erdogan's own worldview), a Siladjcic, Mish'al, or
Ahmadinejad, who will be happy to have the Turks take up his
cause. The Turks then attempt to ram through revisions to at
least the reigning "Western" position to the favor of their
guy. Given, again, the questioning of Western policy and
motives by much of the Turkish public and the AKP, such an
approach provides a relatively low cost and popular tool to
demonstrate influence, power, and the "we're back" slogan.

¶17. (C) This has been, so far, manageable, if at times high
maintenance, in the Balkans and Mideast, although the damage
to Israeli-Turkish relations remains serious. If the Turks
are genuine in their desire to draw Syria away from Iran, and
if they begin achieving real success rather than telephone
books worth of questionable protocols, then that will be of
benefit to us all. But with Iran itself it is a different
story. REF C describes the background to the Turkish
relationship with Iran, one more complicated than with their
ex-Ottoman Arab and other subjects. Trade/hydrocarbon
interests, Turkish aversion to sanctions stemming from the
first Gulf War, Erdogan's vocal "third worldism" and certain
domestic political considerations all push Turkey in the
wrong direction. Unlike with many of the other issues,
however, Turkey will have to stand and be counted on Iran, in
the Security Council, with MD, and in implementation of UN or
US sanctions. This will have a profound effect on relations
second only to the fate of the Armenian protocols over the
next year.

Jeffrey

Ανανέωση 03:20

Η Κίνα και η Google

Από το 2002 οι κινεζικές αρχές είχαν καταφέρει να εισβάλλουν στους υπολογιστές της αμερικανικής κυβέρνησης, στου Δαλάι Λάμα και πολλών αμερικανικών επιχειρήσεων.

Το γεγονός με τη Google ήταν απλώς το κερασάκι στην τούρτα, ένα μικρό μέρος της δυνατότητας της κινεζικής κυβέρνσησης να εισβάλει στα συστήματα και να προκαλεί σαμποτάζ στις επιχειρήσεις.

Ότάν το ανακάλυψε η αμερικανική κυβέρνηση ήταν ήδη αργά.

Η εξαφάνιση της Βόρειας Κορέας

Σε ένα διπλωματικό έγγραφο  αναφέρονται οι συζητήσεις Νοτιοκορεατών και αμερικανών αξιωματούχων για μια ενοποιημένη Κορέα.

Μάλιστα αναφέρονται σε εμπορικό σαμποτάζ που θα μπορούσε να κάνει η Νότια Κορέα στην Πιονγκγιανγκ, εισβάλλοντας στην αγορά της Κίνας, προκειμένου να γονατίσει την οικονομία της Βόρειας Κορέας, που αντιμετωπίζει ήδη πολλά προβλήματα.

Μπερλουσκόνι – Πούτιν

Οι δύο άνδρες συνδέονται με μια στενή φιλία, όπως αναφέρει αμερικανός πράκτορας από τη Ρώμη το 2009.

Η στενή αυτή φιλία μεταφράζεται σε κρυφές ενεργειακές συμφωνίες, με συμβόλαια κάτω από το τραπέζι, ενώ τονίζεται και υπάρξη ενός «σκοτεινού» συνδέσμου από την Ιταλία, χωρίς να διευκρινίζεται ο ρόλος του.

Η «προστασία» από την Υεμένη

Φαίνεται πως για την Υεμένη, ο ρόλος των Αμερικανών στην Μέση Ανατολή ήταν πολύτιμος κατά τη διάρκεια του πολέμου εναντίον της Αλ Κάιντα.

Είχε αναφερθεί και πριν την WikiLeaks ότι η κυβέρνηση της Υεμένης κάλυπτε τους αμερικανικούς βομβαρδισμούς στο τοπικό σκέλος της Αλ Κάιντα στη χώρα, όμως τα απόρρητα έγγραφα αποκαλύπτουν το μέγεθος της εξάρτησης της τοπικής κυβέρνησης από το State Department.

«Θα συνεχίσουμε να λέμε ότι οι βόμβες είναι δικές μαςε και όχι δικές σας» είχε πει τον Ιανουάριο του 2009 ο πρόεδρος της Υεμένης Αλι Αμπντουλάχ Σαλέχ στον στρατηγό Ντέιβιντ Πετράους.

Μάλιστα, στο διάλογο είχε αστειευτεί λέγοντας πως «έστειλα τον πν πρωθυπουργό να πει παραμυθιάσει τη Βουλή πως οι επιθέσεις ήταν δικές μας».

Ανταλλαγή κρατουμένων του Γκουαντάναμο

Ο αμερικανός πρόεδρος Μπάρακ Ομπάμα ήθελε να κλείσει το Γκουαντάναμο γι’ αυτό και επιχειρήσε πολλές φορές να κάνει «ανταλλαγές».

Για παράδειγμα, είχε πει στον Σλοβένο πρωθυπουργό πως αν ήθελε να συναντηθούν  , θα έπρεπε να πάρει έναν φυλακισμένο του  Γκουαντάναμο.

Επίσης, φέρεται να πρόσφερε πολλά εκατομμύρια δολάρια στο Κιριμπάτι για να δεχθεί τους Κινέζους κρατουμένους των φυλακών, ενώ είχε πει στο Βέλγιο, πως ο τρόπος για να ενισχύσουν τη θέση τους στην ΕΕ, θα τους κόστιζε μερικούς φυλακισμένους..

"Λίγος" για τους Αμερικανούς ο Ερντογάν- Φιλόδοξος ο Νταβούτογλου

Οι αμερικανοί διπλωμάτες είναι δύσπιστοι απέναντι στον πρωθυπουργό της Τουρκίας Ρετζέπ Ταγίπ Ερντογάν, τον οποίο θεωρούν απομονωμένο και ελλιπώς ενημερωμένο, αποκαλύπτουν τα τηλεγραφήματα που περιήλθαν στην κατοχή του WikiLeaks και αναλύει το γερμανικό περιοδικό Der Spiegel.

Ο Ερντογάν δεν εμπιστεύεται κανέναν και "περιβάλλεται από ένα κύκλο συμβούλων που τον κολακεύουν αλλά τον αψηφούν". Λαμβάνει τις πληροφορίες του σχεδόν αποκλειστικά από τις εφημερίδες των ισλαμιστών και οι αναλύσεις των υπουργείων του δεν τον ενδιαφέρουν, γράφουν οι αμερικανοί διπλωμάτες στην Άγκυρα.

Ο Ερντογάν φοβάται μήπως χάσει την εξουσία, εκτιμούν οι διπλωμάτες. Μια από τις πηγές τους, επισημαίνει: "Ο Ταγίπ πιστεύει στο Θεό αλλά δεν τον εμπιστεύεται", γράφει το Der Spiegel.

Η διπλωματική αλληλογραφία αναπαράγει φήμες περί υποτιθέμενης διαφθοράς του πρωθυπουργού, ο οποίος φέρεται να πλούτισε κατά την ιδιωτικοποίηση ενός διυλιστηρίου πετρελαίου. Ο υπουργός Εξωτερικών Αχμέτ Νταβούτογλου χαρακτηρίζεται "εξαιρετικά επικίνδυνος" από έναν πληροφοριοδότη των αμερικανών διπλωματών, ο οποίος τους προειδοποιεί για την ισλαμιστική επιρροή του στον Ερντογάν.

Η πρεσβεία τρέφει υποψίες ότι ο Νταβούτογλου ονειρεύεται μια επάνοδο της οθωμανικής δύναμης και μάλιστα μετά μια ομιλία του στο Σαράγεβο τον Ιανουάριο του 2010, υποψιάζονται ότι θέλει να επαναφέρει την τουρκική επιρροή στα Βαλκάνια.

Οι διπλωμάτες δεν είναι σίγουροι για τη σταθερότητα της κυβέρνησης στην Τουρκία, που είναι από τους σημαντικότερους συμμάχους της, σύμφωνα με τα τηλεγραφήματα που συντάχθηκαν φέτος το Φεβρουάριο και τα οποία δημοσιοποιεί περιληπτικά το γερμανικό περιοδικό.

Τρελός ο Τσάβες

Ο πρόεδρος της Βενεζουέλας Ούγκο Τσάβες είναι "τρελός" και ετοιμάζεται να μετατρέψει τη χώρα του "σε μια άλλη Ζιμπάμπουε" εκτίμησε τον Σεπτέμβριο του 2009 ο Ζαν-Νταβίντ Λετίβ, διπλωματικός σύμβουλος του προέδρου Νικολά Σαρκοζί, σύμφωνα με τον ιστότοπο Wikileaks .

"Ο Λετίβ παρατηρεί ότι ο πρόεδρος της Βενεζουέλας είναι τρελός και αναφέρει ότι ουτε η Βραζιλία δεν μπορεί πλέον να τον υποστηρίξει" σύμφωνα με το έγγραφο που περιλαμβάνει συνομιλία μεταξύ του γάλλου συμβούλου του Σαρκοζί με τον αμερικανό υφυπουργό Φίλιπ Γκόρντον. Η συνομιλία τους έγινε στις 16 Σεπτεμβρίου του 2009.

"Δυστυχώς ο Τσάβες κατέχει μια από τις πιό πλούσιες χώρες της Λατινικής Αμερικής και θα την μετατρέψει σε μια άλλη Ζιμπάμπουε" αναφέρεται ακόμα στο έγγραφο με τη συνομιλία Λετίβ-Γκόρτον, ένα από τα 250 χιλιάδες αμερικανικά διπλωματiκά έγγραφα που αποκαλύπτει το Wikileaks,όπως γράφει η βρετανική εφημερίδα "Γκάρντιαν".

Για ότι περαιτέρω θα υπάρχει νέα ενημέρωση σε αυτή την ανάρτηση!

Πηγή1
Πηγή2

Πηγή3